The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (hrc) is a generalisation of the classical Hospitals / Resident problem (hr) that is important in practical applications because it models the case where couples submit joint preference lists over pairs of (typically geographically close) hospitals. In this report we present new NP-completeness results for the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists, in highly restricted instances of hrc. Further, we present an Integer Programming (IP) model for hrc and extend it the case where preference lists can include ties. Also, we describe an empirical study of an IP model for hrc and its extension to the case where preference lists can include ties. This model was applied to randomly generated instances and also real-world instances arising from previous matching runs of the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme, used to allocate junior doctors to hospitals in Scotland.
Introduction

The Hospitals / Residents problem.
The Hospitals / Residents problem (hr) is a many-to-one allocation problem. An instance of hr consists of two groups of agents -one containing hospitals and one containing residents. Every hospital expresses a linear preference over some subset of the residents, its preference list. The residents in a hospital's preference list are its acceptable partners. Further, every hospital has a capacity, c j , the maximum number of posts it has available to match with residents. Every resident expresses a linear preference over some subset of the hospitals, his acceptable hospitals.
The preferences expressed in this fashion are reciprocal: if a resident r i is acceptable to a hospital h j , then h j is also acceptable to r i , and vice versa. A many-to-one matching between residents and hospitals is sought, which is a set of acceptable resident-hospital pairs such that each resident appears in at most one pair and each hospital h j at most c j pairs. If a resident r i appears in some pair of M , r i is said to be assigned in M and unassigned otherwise. Any hospital assigned fewer residents than its capacity in some matching M is under-subscribed in M .
A matching is stable if it admits no blocking pair. Following the definition used in [11] , a blocking pair consists of a mutually acceptable resident-hospital pair (r, h) such that both of the following hold: (i) either r is unassigned, or r prefers h to his assigned hospital; (ii) either h is under-subscribed in the matching, or h prefers r to at least one of its assigned residents. Were such a pair to exist, they could form a private arrangement outside of the matching, undermining its integrity [26] .
It is known that every instance of hr admits at least one stable matching and such a matching may be found in time linear in the size of the instance [11] . Also, for an arbitrary hr instance I, any resident that is assigned in one stable matching in I is assigned in all stable matchings in I, moreover any hospital that is under-subscribed in some stable matching in I is assigned exactly the same set of residents in every stable matching in I [12, 27, 26] .
hr can be viewed as an abstract model of the matching process involved in a centralised matching scheme such as the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) [32] through which graduating medical students are assigned to hospital posts in the USA. A similar process was used until recently to match medical graduates to Foundation Programme places in Scotland, called the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS) [14] . Analogous allocation schemes having a similar underlying problem model exist around the world, both in the medical sphere, e.g. in Canada [33] , Japan [31] , and beyond, e.g. in higher education allocation in Hungary [5] .
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples
Centralised matching schemes such as the NRMP and the SFAS have had to evolve to accommodate couples who wish to be allocated to (geographically) compatible hospitals. The requirement to take into account the joint preferences of couples has been in place in the NRMP context since 1983 and since 2009 in the case of SFAS. In schemes where the agents may be involved in couples, the underlying allocation problem can modelled by the so-called Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (hrc).
As in the case of hr, an instance of hrc consists of a set of hospitals H and a set of residents R. The residents in R are partitioned into two sets, S and S . The set S consists of single residents and the set S consists of those residents involved in couples. There is a set C = {(r i , r j ) : r i , r j ∈ S } of couples such that each resident in S belongs to exactly one pair in C.
Each single resident r i ∈ S expresses a linear preference order over his acceptable hospitals. Each pair of residents (r i , r j ) ∈ C expresses a joint linear preference order over a subset A of H × H where (h p , h q ) ∈ A represents the joint assignment of r i to h p and r j to h q . The hospital pairs in A represent those joint assignments that are acceptable to (r i , r j ), all other joint assignments being unacceptable to (r i , r j ). Each hospital h j ∈ H expresses a linear preference order over those residents who find h j acceptable, either as a single resident or as part of a couple. As in the hr case, each hospital h j ∈ H has a capacity, c j .
A many-to-one matching between residents and hospitals is sought, which is defined as for hr with the additional restriction that each couple (r i , r j ) is either jointly unassigned, meaning that both r i and r j are unassigned, or jointly assigned to some pair (h k , h l ) that (r i , r j ) find acceptable.As in hr, we seek a stable matching, which guarantees that no resident and hospital, and no couple and pair of hospitals, have an incentive to deviate from their assignments and become assigned to each other.
Roth [26] considered stability in the hrc context although did not define the concept explicitly. Whilst Gusfield and Irving [13] defined stability in hrc, their definition neglected to deal with the case that both members of a couple may wish to be assigned to the same hospital. Manlove and McDermid [20] extended their definition to deal with this possibility. Henceforth, we refer to Manlove and McDermid's stability definition as MM-stability. We now define this concept formally.
Definition 1.
A matching M is MM-stable if none of the following holds:
1. The matching is blocked by a hospital h j and a single resident r i , as in the classical HR problem.
2. The matching is blocked by a couple (r i , r j ) and a hospital h k such that either (a) (r i , r j ) prefers (h k , M (r j )) to (M (r i ), M (r j )), and h k is either under-subscribed in M or prefers r i to some member of M (h k )\{r j } or (b) (r i , r j ) prefers (M (r i ), h k ) to (M (r i ), M (r j )), and h k is either under-subscribed in M or prefers r j to some member of M (h k )\{r i }
3.
The matching is blocked by a couple (r i , r j ) and (not necessarily distinct) hospitals h k = M (r i ), h l = M (r j ); that is, (r i , r j ) prefers the joint assignment (h k , h l ) to (M (r i ), M (r j )), and either (a) h k = h l , and h k (respectively h l ) is either under-subscribed in M or prefers r i (respectively r j ) to at least one of its assigned residents in M ; or (b) h k = h l , and h k has at least two free posts in M , i.e., c k − |M (h k )|≥ 2; or (c) h k = h l , and h k has one free post in M , i.e., c k − |M (h k )|= 1, and h k prefers at least one of r i , r j to some member of M (h k ); or (d) h k = h l , h k is full in M , h k prefers r i to some r s ∈ M (h k ), and h k prefers r j to some r t ∈ M (h k )\{r s }.
The majority of the results in this paper for hrc are given in terms of MM-stability. A further stability definition due to Biró et al [6] (henceforth BIS-stability) can be applied in contexts where the hospitals rank the residents according to an agreed criterion, such as in the SFAS context where this criterion is represented by a score derived for each resident from their academic performance and their completed application. The rationale behind the BIS stability definition being that in a stable matching M , if a resident r is not matched to a hospital h then all of the residents who are matched to h in M are strictly preferable to r under the applied criterion. We now define BIS-stability formally as follows.
Definition 2.
A matching M is BIS-stable if none of the following holds:
2. The matching is blocked by a hospital h k and a resident r i who is coupled, say with r j ; that is either (a) (r i , r j ) prefers (h k , M (r j )) to (M (r i ), M (r j )) and either (i) h k = M (r j ) and h k is either under-subscribed in M or prefers r i to some member of M (h k ) or
(ii) h k = M (r j ) and h k is either under-subscribed in M or prefers both r i and r j to some member of M (h k ) \ {r j } (b) (r i , r j ) prefers (M (r i ), h k ) to (M (r i ), M (r j )) and either (i) or (ii) as above adapted to symmetric case 3. The matching is blocked by a couple (r i , r j ) and (not necessarily distinct) hospitals h k = M (r i ) and h l = M (r j ); that is, (r i , r j ) prefers the joint assignment (h k , h l ) to (M (r i ), M (r j )), and either (a) h k = h l , and h k (respectively h l ) is either under-subscribed in M or prefers r i (respectively r j ) to at least one of its assignees in M ; or (b) h k = h l , and h k has at least two free posts in M or (c) h k = h l , and h k has one free post in M and both r i and r j are preferred by h k to some member of M (h k ) and (d) h k = h l , h k is full in M and either (i) h k prefers each of r i and r j to some r p ∈ M (h k ) who is a member of a couple with some r q ∈ M (h k ), (ii) the least preferred resident among r i and r j (according to h k ) is preferred by h k to two members of M (h k )
It is notable that, for an arbitrary instance I of hrc in which hospitals may have a capacity greater than 1, an MM-stable matching need not be BIS-stable and vice versa. The instances described in Section 5 demonstrate this unequivocally. In the restriction of hrc in which each hospitals has a capacity of 1, BIS-stability and MM-stability are both equivalent to the stability definition from Gusfield and Irving [13] since no couple (r i , r j ) may express a preference for a hospital pair (h k , h k ).
The Hospitals / Residents Problem with Couples and Ties (hrct) is a generalisation of hrc in which hospitals (respectively residents) may find some subsets of their acceptable residents (respectively hospitals) equally preferable. Residents (respectively hospitals) that are found equally preferable by a hospital (respectively resident) are tied with each other in the preference list of that hospital (respectively resident). The stability definitions in Definition 1 and Definition 2 remain unchanged in the hrct context.
Existing algorithmic results for hrc.
In contrast with hr, an instance of hrc need not admit a stable matching [26] . Also an instance of hrc may admit stable matchings of differing sizes [2] . Further, the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists in an instance of hrc is NP-complete, even in the restricted case where there are no single residents and all of the hospitals have only one available post [25, 22] .
In many practical applications of hrc the residents' preference lists are short. Let (α, β)-hrc denote the restriction of hrc in which each single resident's preference list contains at most α hospitals, each couple's preference list contains at most α pairs of hospitals and each hospital's preference list contains at most β residents. (α, β)-hrc is hard even for small values of α and β: Manlove and McDermid [20] showed that (3, 6) -hrc is NP-complete.
A further restriction of hrc is hrc-dual-market, defined as follows. Given an instance I of hrc, let the set of all first members of each couple in I be R 1 ⊆ R, and the set of second members of each couple in I be R 2 ⊆ R. Let the set of acceptable partners of the residents in R 1 in I be H 1 ⊆ H and the set of acceptable partners of the residents in R 2 in I be H 2 ⊆ H. If in I, H 1 ∩ H 2 = ∅ and no single resident has acceptable partners in both H 1 and H 2 then we define I to be an instance of hrc-dual-market consisting of the two disjoint markets R 1 ∪ H 1 and R 2 ∪ H 2 . The problem of deciding whether an instance of hrc-dual-market admits a stable matching is also known to be NP-complete [21] even if the instance contains no single residents and the hospitals all have capacity one.
Since the existence of an efficient algorithm for finding a stable matching, or reporting that none exists, in an instance of hrc is unlikely, in practical applications such as SFAS and NRMP, stable matchings are found by applying heuristics [6, 28] . However, neither the SFAS heuristic, nor the NRMP heuristic guarantee to terminate and output a stable matching, even in instances where a stable matching does exist. Hence, a method which guarantees to find a maximum cardinality stable matching in an arbitrary instance of hrc, where one exists, might be of considerable interest. For further results on hrc the reader is referred to [7] and [18] .
For further results in hrc the reader is referred to [7] and [18] .
Linear Programming, Integer Programming and Constraint Programming techniques applied to hr and its variants
Vande Vate [30] described a Linear Programming (LP) formulation for the Stable Marriage problem, the one-to-one variant of hr in which all hospitals have a capacity of 1, the numbers of residents and hospitals are the same, and each of the residents finds every hospital acceptable. Rothblum [29] generalised this model to the hr context for arbitrary instances. Baïou and Balinski [3] formulated an LP model for hr which Fleiner [10] further generalised to the many-to-many version of hr, a variant in which both hospitals and residents may have capacities exceeding one. Podhradsky [24] empirically investigated the performance of approximation algorithms for max-smti (the 1-1 restriction of max-hrt, the NP-hard problem of finding a maximum cardinality stable matching given an instance of hrt) and compared them against one another and against an IP formulation for max-smti. Kwanashie and Manlove [17] described an Integer Programming (IP) model for the Hospitals Residents problem with Ties (hrt).
Manlove et al. [19] and Eirinakis et al [8] applied Constraint Programming (CP) techniques to hr while O'Malley [23] described a CP formulation for hrt. Subsequently, Eirinakis et al [9] gave a generalised CP formulation for many-to-many hr. The reader is referred to Ref. [18, Sections 2.4 & 2.5] for more information about previous work involving the application of IP and CP techniques applied to allocation problems such as hr.
Contribution of this work
In Section 2 of this paper we present a collection of new hardness results for hrc. We begin in Section 2.2.1 by presenting a new NP-completeness result for the problem of deciding whether there exists a stable matching in an instance of (2, 2)-hrc where there are no single residents and all hospitals have capacity 1. This is the most restricted case of hrc currently known for which NP-completeness holds. A natural way to try to cope with this complexity is to approximate a matching that is 'as stable as possible', i.e., admits the minimum number of blocking pairs [1] . Let min-bp-hrc denote the problem of finding a matching with the minimum number of blocking pairs, given an instance of hrc, and let (α, β)-min-bp-hrc denote the restriction to instances of (α, β)-hrc. In Section 2.2.2 we prove that (2, 2)-min-bp-hrc is not approximable within N 1−ε , where N is the number of residents in a given instance, for any ε > 0, unless P=NP.
In Section 2.3 we show that (2, 3) -hrc is also NP-complete even when all of the hospitals have capacity 1 and there are no single residents and the preference list of each couple and hospital are derived from a strictly ordered master list of pairs of hospitals and residents respectively. Further, in Section 2.4 we show that deciding whether an instance of (3, 3) hrc-dual-market (which is an instance of hrc-dual-market in which the residents', couples' and hospitals' preference lists have a maximum length of three) admits a stable matching, is NP-complete even when all hospitals have capacity 1 and the preference lists of all residents, couples and hospitals are derived from a master list of hospitals, hospital pairs and residents respectively.
Further in Section 3.2 we present a description of the first IP model for finding a maximum cardinality stable matching or reporting that none exists in an arbitrary instance of hrc. Then in Section 4 we present experimental results obtained from a Java implementation of the IP model for hrc applied to randomly generated instances of hrc constructed in a manner consistent with the SFAS format. We further extend this model to find a maximum cardinality stable matching in the more general hrct context and apply it to real-world instances arising from previous matching runs of SFAS, the allocation scheme previously used to allocate junior doctors to hospitals in Scotland.
Section 5 of the report presents a cloning methodology for hrc which can be used to construct an instance of one-to-one hrc from an instance of many-to-one hrc where the MM-stable matchings in the many-to-one instance are in correspondence to the MM-stable matchings in the one-to-one instance. Finally, in Section 6 we present some conclusions based on the work presented.
Complexity Results for hrc
Introduction
In this section we present hardness results for finding and approximating stable matchings in instances of hrc. We begin in Section 2.2.1 by establishing NP-completness for the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists in a highly restricted instance of hrc.
We then turn to min-bp-hrc in Section 2.2.2. Clearly Theorem 1 in Section 2.2.1 implies that this problem is NP-hard. By chaining together instances of (2, 2)-hrc constructed in the proof of Theorem 1, we arrive at a gap-introducing reduction which establishes a strong inapproximability result for min-bp-hrc under the same restrictions as in Theorem 1 in Section 2.2.1.
Using a similar reduction to the one used to show NP-completeness in instances of (2, 2)-hrc, in Section 2.3 we show that, given an instance of (2, 3) -hrc, the problem of deciding whether the instance admits a stable matching is NP-complete even under the restriction that all of the hospitals have capacity 1, there are no single residents and the preference lists for all of the single residents, couples and hospitals are derived from a master list of hospitals, hospital pairs and residents respectively.
Finally in Section 2.4 we show that, given an instance of (3, 3)-hrc-dual-market, the problem of deciding whether there exists a stable matching is NP-complete. Again, we show that the result holds under the restriction that the hospitals have capacity 1 and that the result also holds under the further restriction that the preference lists for all of the single residents, couples and hospitals are derived from a master list of hospitals, hospital pairs and residents respectively.
Complexity results for (2, 2)-hrc
2.2.1 NP-completeness result for (2, 2)-hrc Theorem 1. Given an instance of (2, 2)-hrc, the problem of deciding whether there exists a stable matching is NP-complete. The result holds even if there are no single residents and each hospital has capacity 1.
Proof. The proof of this result uses a reduction from a restricted version of sat. More specifically, let (2,2)-e3-sat denote the problem of deciding, given a Boolean formula B in CNF over a set of variables V , whether B is satisfiable, where B has the following properties: (i) each clause contains exactly 3 literals and (ii) for each v i ∈ V , each of literals v i andv i appears exactly twice in B. Berman et al. [4] showed that (2,2)-e3-sat is NP-complete.
The problem (2, 2) -hrc is clearly in NP, as a given assignment may be verified to be a stable matching in polynomial time. To show NP-hardness, let B be an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat. Let V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } and C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c m } be the set of variables and clauses respectively in B. Then for each v i ∈ V , each of literals v i andv i appears exactly twice in B. Also |c j |= 3 for each c j ∈ C. (Hence m = 4n 3 .) We form an instance I of (2, 2)-hrc as follows.
The set of residents in
There are no single residents in I and the pairing of the residents into couples is as shown in Figure 1 .
The set of hospitals in I is H ∪T , where
and each hospital has capacity 1. The preference lists of the resident couples and hospitals in I are shown in Figure 1 .
In the joint preference list of a couple ( ) denotes the resident x s j such that the r th occurrence of literalv i occurs at position s of clause c j .
We claim that B is satisfiable if and only if I admits a stable matching. Let f be a satisfying truth assignment of B. Define a matching M in I as follows. For each variable v i ∈ V , if v i is true under f , add the pairs in T i to M , otherwise add the pairs in F i to M . Let j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) be given. Then c j contains at least one literal that is true under f . Suppose c j contains exactly one literal that is true under f . Let s be the position of c j containing a true literal. In this case add the pairs {(x s+1 j , t No resident pair ( to y s j . Hence M is a stable matching in I. Conversely suppose that M is a stable matching in I. We form a truth assignment f in B as follows.
For
. Clearly, at most one couple (x s j , y s j ) may be matched to the hospital pair in second place on its preference list. Since no (x s j , y s j ) is matched to the pair in first place in its preference list one of the remaining two unmatched (x s j , y s j )'s must block with the hospital pair in second place on its preference list, a contradiction.
If r ∈ {3, 5} then we set f (v i ) = T . Thus, variable v i is true under f and hence clause c j is true under f since the literal v i occurs in c j . Otherwise, r ∈ {4, 6} and we set f (v i ) = F . Thus, variable v i is false under f and hence clause c j is true under f since the literalv i occurs in c j .
This assignment of truth values is well-defined, for if (h r i , t
is partnered with a member of X in M . Hence f is a satisfying truth assignment of B.
Inapproximability of (2, 2)-min-bp-hrc
Let A be an instance of (2, 2)-hrc as shown in Figure 2 . In A the residents are a, b and c, the hospitals are z 1 and z 2 and each hospital has a capacity of 1. The instance S admits three non-empty matchings, namely
Clearly, none of the matchings is stable. Further each of the non-empty matchings in A is blocked by precisely one blocking pair. M 1 is blocked in A by only (c, z 2 ), M 2 is blocked in A by only ((a, b), (z 1 , z 2 )) and M 3 is blocked in A by only (c, z 1 ). Thus, A admits no stable matching but amongst all of the non-empty matchings admitted by A, the only number of blocking pairs possible (and thus the minimum) is 1. We shall use this property of the instance A in the proofs that follow. The following theorem allows us to prove that, unless P=NP, there is a limit on the approximability of min-bp-hrc in a highly restricted case.
Theorem 2. min-bp-hrc is not approximable within n 1−ε 1 , where n 1 is the number of residents in a given instance, for any ε > 0 unless P=NP even if there are no single residents and the resident couples and hospitals have preference lists of length ≤ 2.
Proof. Let B be an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat and let I be the corresponding instance of (2, 2)-hrc as constructed in Theorem 1. We show how to modify I in order to obtain an extended instance I of (2, 2)-hrc as follows.
Choose c = 2/ε and k = n c . Now, let I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I k be k disjoint copies of the instance I. Let I be the (2, 2)-hrc instance formed by taking the union of the sub-instances I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I k . Let I be the instance constructed by adding the instance A of (2, 2)-hrc described in Figure 2 to I .
If B admits a satisfying truth assignment then by Theorem 1, I admits a stable matching and clearly each copy of I must also admit a stable matching. Thus I must admit a stable matching. Moreover, since any non-empty matching admitted by A has exactly one blocking pair, a matching exists in I which has exactly one blocking pair.
If B admits no satisfying truth assignment, then by Theorem 1, I admits no stable matching. We claim that any matching admitted by I must be blocked by k + 1 or more blocking pairs. Since I admits no stable matching, any matching in I must have at least one blocking pair. Thus each I r (1 ≤ r ≤ k) admits only matchings with one or more blocking pair. Since the only non-empty matchings admitted by A have a single blocking pair, any matching admitted by I must have at least k + 1 blocking pairs.
The number of residents in I is n 1 = 4nk + 6mk + 3. From the construction of I in Theorem 1 we know that 4n = 3m and thus n 1 ≤ 12nk + 3. We lose no generality by assuming that n ≥ 3. Thus n 1 ≤ 13nk = 13n c+1 .
Moreover,
Now we know that n 1 ≥ k = n c . We lose no generality by assuming that n ≥ 13 and hence n 1 ≥ 13 c . It follows that
Thus it follows from Inequality 1 and 2 that
We now show that n
. Observe that c ≥ 2/ε and thus c + 1 ≥ 2/ε. Hence
and hence by Inequality 3, n 1−ε 1 ≤ k. Assume that X is an approximation algorithm for (2, 2)-hrc with a performance guarantee of n 1−ε 1 ≤ k. Let B be an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat and construct an instance I of (2, 2)-hrc from B as described above. If B admits a satisfying truth assignment then X must return a matching in I which admits ≤ k blocking pairs. Otherwise, B does not admit a satisfying assignment and X must return a matching which admits ≥ k + 1 blocking pairs. Thus algorithm X may be used to determine whether B admits a satisfying truth assignment in polynomial time, a contradiction. Hence, no such polynomial approximation algorithm can exist unless P = N P .
Complexity results for (2, 3)-hrc with master lists
Theorem 3. Given an instance of (2, 3)-hrc, the problem of deciding whether the instance supports a stable matching is NP-complete. The result holds even if there are no single residents and each hospital has capacity 1.
The problem (2, 3) -hrc is clearly in NP, as a given assignment may be verified to be a stable matching in polynomial time.
To show NP-hardness, let B be an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat. Let V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } and C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c m } be the set of variables and clauses respectively in B. Then for each v i ∈ V , each of literals v i andv i appears exactly twice in B. Also |c j |= 3 for each c j ∈ C. (Hence m = 4n 3 .) We form an instance I of (2, 3)-hrc as follows. The set of residents in I is X ∪ P ∪ Q, where
There are no single residents in I and the pairing of the residents into couples is as shown in Figure 3 .
The set of hospitals in I is H ∪Y , where
and each hospital has capacity 1. The preference lists of the resident couples and hospitals in I are shown in Figure 3 .
In the joint preference list of a couple (
Similarly in the joint preference list of a couple (
denotes the hospital y s j ∈ Y such that the rth occurrence of literalv i appears at position s of clause c j in B.
Also in the preference list of a hospital y s j ∈ Y , if literal v i (respectivelyv i ) appears at position s of clause c j ∈ C, the symbol x(y s j ) denotes the resident
according as this is the first or second occurrence of the literal in B. No resident pair (
, and equally no matching in which (
) (where addition is taken modulo 3), then at least one of y s j or y s+1 j is matched to its first choice and therefore (p s j , q s j ) may not block M with (y s j , y s+1 j ). Hence M is a stable matching in I.
Figure 3: Preference lists in I, the constructed instance of (2, 3)-hrc.
Conversely suppose that M is a stable matching in I. We form a truth assignment f in B as follows.
and therefore v i is true under f and hence c j is true under f . Otherwise x(y s j ) =x r i , so (x r i , y s j ) ∈ F i andv i is false under f and hence c j is true under f .
Hence f is a satisfying truth assignment of B.
Corollary 4. Given an instance of (2, 3)-hrc, the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete. The result holds even in the case where there are no single residents, each hospital has capacity 1 and the preference list of each couple and hospital are derived from a strictly ordered master list of pairs of hospitals and residents respectively.
Proof. Consider the instance I of (2, 3)-hrc as constructed in the proof of Theorem 3, and let n and m be defined as in the proof of Theorem 3. The master lists shown in Figures 4 and 5 indicate that the preference list of each resident couple and hospital may be derived from a master list of hospital pairs and residents respectively. Since there are no single residents in I, no preferences are expressed for individual hospitals in I.
As we have previously shown that (2,2)-e3-sat may be reduced to the instance I in polynomial time, the corollary has been proven. Figure 4 : Master list of preferences for resident couples in (2, 3)-hrc instance I. 
Complexity results for (3, 3)-hrc-dual-market with master lists
Theorem 5. Given an instance of (3, 3)-hrc, the problem of deciding whether the instance supports a complete stable matching is NP-complete. The result holds even if all hospitals have capacity 1.
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP, as a given assignment may be verified to be a complete, stable matching in polynomial time.
We use a reduction from a restricted version of sat. More specifically, let (2,2)-e3-sat denote the problem of deciding, given a Boolean formula B in CNF over a set of variables V , whether B is satisfiable, where B has the following properties: (i) each clause contains exactly 3 literals and (ii) for each v i ∈ V , each of literals v i andv i appears exactly twice in B. Berman et al. [4] showed that (2,2)-e3-sat is NP-complete.
Let B be an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat. We construct an instance I of (3, 3)-hrc using a similar reduction to that employed by Irving et al. [16] . Let V = {v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v n−1 } and C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c m } be the set of variables and clauses respectively in B. Then for each v i ∈ V , each of literals v i andv i appears exactly twice in B. Also |c j |= 3 for each c j ∈ C. (Hence m = 
The residents in Q ∪ T are single and the residents in X ∪ K ∪ P are involved in couples.
The set of
In the joint preference list of a couple (x 4i+r , k 4i+r )(x 4i+r ∈ X, k 4i+r ∈ K), if r ∈ {0, 1}, the symbol c(x 4i+r ) denotes the hospital c s j ∈ C such that the (r +1)th occurrence of literal v i appears at position s of c j . Similarly if r ∈ {2, 3} then the symbol c(x 4i+r ) denotes the hospital c s j ∈ C such that the (r − 1)th occurrence of literalv i appears at position s of c j .
Figure 6: Preference lists in I, the constructed instance of (3, 3)-hrc.
Also in the preference list of a hospital c s j ∈ C , if literal v i appears at position s of clause c j ∈ C, the symbol x(c s j ) denotes the resident x 4i+r−1 where r = 1, 2 according as this is the first or second occurrence of literal v i in B. Otherwise if literalv i appears at position s of clause c j ∈ C, the symbol x(c s j ) denotes the resident x 4i+r+1 where r = 1, 2 according as this is the first or second occurrence of literalv i in B.
The preference lists of the residents and hospitals in I are shown in Figure 6 and diagramatically in Figures 7 and 8 . Clearly each preference list is of length at most 3.
, where addition is taken modulo 4.
We claim that B is satisfiable if and only if I admits a complete stable matching. Firstly suppose that B is satisfiable and let f be a satisfying truth assignment of B. Define a complete matching M in I as follows. For each variable v i ∈ V , if v i is true under f , add the pairs in T i to M , otherwise add the pairs in F i to M .
Let j(1 ≤ j ≤ m) be given. Then c j contains at least one literal that is true under f . Suppose this literal occurs at position s of c j (1 ≤ s ≤ 3). Then add the pairs (q j , c s j ), in C, which ranks him last) nor can a resident in T (since he can only potentially prefer a hospital z j (3 ≤ j ≤ 5) who ranks him last).
Suppose that (x 4i+r , k 4i+r ) blocks M with (c(x 4i+r ), l 4i+a ), where 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, 0 ≤ r ≤ 3 and 1 ≤ a ≤ 3. Then (x 4i+r , k 4i+r ) are jointly matched with their third choice pair.
This means that c s j has its first choice and cannot form part of a blocking pair, a contradiction. Conversely suppose that M is a complete stable matching in I. We form a truth assignment f in B as follows.
by the stability of M . Thus variable v i is true under f , and hence clause c j is true under f , since literal v i occurs in c j . If r ∈ {2, 3} then (x 4i+r , y 4i+r+1 ) ∈ M (or equivalently (k 4i+r , l 4i+r+1 ) ∈ M ) (where addition is taken modulo 4) by the stability of M . Thus variable v i is false under f , and hence clause c j is true under f , since literalv i occurs in c j . Hence f is a satisfying truth assignment of B.
Thus, the claim holds and B is satisfiable if and only if I admits a complete, stable matching.
Let I be the instance of (3, 3)-com-hrc as constructed in the proof of Theorem 5 from an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat. We add additional residents and hospitals to I to obtain a new instance I of (3, 3)-com-hrc as follows. For every y 4i+r ∈ Y add further residents
The preference lists of the agents so added for a single y 4i+r ∈ Y are shown in Figure 9 and diagrammatically in Figure 10 where Φ 4i+r represents those preferences expressed by y 4i+r in I \ (U ∪ H).
Lemma 6. In any stable matching M in I , for every y 4i+r ∈ Y , M (y 4i+r ) ∈ X. We now show through the following two Lemmata that if M is a stable matching in I and
M is a complete stable matching in I, the reduced (3, 3)-hrc instance obtained by removing all of the agents in U ∪ H from I .
Lemma 7.
No hospital in Z ∪ C may be unmatched and no resident in P ∪ T ∪ Q may be unmatched in any stable matching M in I . 
j is unmatched, a contradiction. Thus, t j must be matched in any matching admitted by I .
Assume some resident p s j is unmatched in M for some j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) and s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3). Then (p s j , p Observe that no c s j (1 ≤ s ≤ 3, 1 ≤ j ≤ m) can be matched to x(c s j ), for otherwise M (y 4i+r ) / ∈ X for some y 4i+r ∈ Y a contradiction to Lemma 6. Since z 1 j must be matched to some p s j (1 ≤ s ≤ 3) and since no resident in P may be unmatched, then for s ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that s = s, c s j must be matched with the corresponding p s j . Thus, (q j , c s j ) ∈ M for otherwise (q j , c s j ) blocks M in I . Thus all residents in Q and hospitals in C must be matched in any stable matching admitted by I . Proof. By Lemma 6, M (y 4i+r ) ∈ X for all y 4i+r ∈ Y . Hence M (x 4i+r ) ∈ Y for all x 4i+r ∈ X. Since (x 4i+r , k 4i+r ) are a couple for all x 4i+r ∈ X, it follows that
The proof of the previous three Lemmas allows us to now state the following more general theorem. Theorem 9. Given an instance, I of (3, 3)-hrc, the problem of deciding whether I admits a stable matching is NP-complete.
Proof. Let B be an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat. Construct an instance I of (3, 3)-hrc as described in the proof of Theorem 5 and as illustrated in Figure 6 and extend this instance as described above and as illustrated in Figure 9 to obtain the instance I of (3, 3)-hrc.
Let f be a satisfying truth assignment of B. Define a matching M in I as in the proof of Theorem 5. Define a matching M in I as follows: Recall that an instance of (3, 3)-hrc-dual-market is an instance of hrc-dual-market in which no resident, couple or hospital has a preference list of length greater than 3. We now show that the instance described in Theorem 9 represents a dual market and thus we are able to show that deciding whether a stbale matching exists in an instance of (3, 3)-hrc-dual-market is also NP-complete.
Corollary 10. Given an instance of (3, 3)-hrc-dual-market, the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete. The result holds even if each hospital has capacity 1 and the preference list of each single resident, couple and hospital is derived from a strictly ordered master list of hospitals, pairs of hospitals and residents respectively.
Proof. Let I be the instance of (3, 3) -hrc constructed in the proof of Theorem 9. The residents in I can be partitioned into two disjoint sets, R 1 = X ∪ P 1 ∪ Q ∪ U 1 where P 1 = {p s j : 1 ≤ s ≤ 3} and U 1 = {u s 4i+r : s ∈ {1, 3, 5}} and R 2 = K ∪ P 2 ∪ T ∪ U 2 where P 2 = {p s j : 4 ≤ s ≤ 6} and U 2 = {u s 4i+r : s ∈ {2, 4}}. Further, the hospitals in I may also be partitioned into two disjoint sets,
. A resident r ∈ R i finds acceptable only those hospitals in A i and a hospital h ∈ A i finds acceptable only those residents in R i . From this construction it can be seen that the instance I represents a dual market consisting of two disjoint markets, (R 1 ∪ A 1 ) and (R 2 ∪ A 2 ).
The master lists shown in Figures 11, 12 and 13 indicate that the preference list of each single resident, couple and hospital may be derived from a master list of hospital pairs, residents and hospitals respectively. Thus, the result follows immediately from Theorem 9. 
Figure 12: Master list of preferences for single residents in (3, 3)-com-hrc instance I. 3 Integer programming models for Hospitals / Residents problem variants
In this section we present a range of IP models for hr, hrc and hrct. We begin by giving an IP model for hr in Section 3.1. This model is then extended in Section 3.2 to the hrc context. We further provide a worked example in Section 3.3 with a view to demonstrating how the IP model for hrc may be constructed from a small example instance. We then extend the IP model for hrc to the more general hrct context in Section 3.4. Detailed proofs of the correctness of both the hr, hrc and hrct models are also presented in the relevant sections.
3.1 An IP formulation for the hr
Variables in the IP model for hr
The IP model is designed around a series of linear inequalities that establish the absence of blocking pairs. The variables are defined for each resident and for each element on his/her preference list (with the possibility of being unmatched). Let I be an instance of hr with residents R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n 1 } and hospitals H = {h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h n 2 } where each resident r i ∈ R, has a preference list of length l(r i ) consisting of individual hospitals h j ∈ H. Each hospital h j ∈ H has a preference list of individual residents r i ∈ R of length l(h j ). Further, each hospital h j has a capacity c j representing the number of available posts it has to match with residents.
Let J be the following Integer Programming (IP) formulation of I. In J, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 ) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r i )), define a variable x i,p such that
1 if r i is assigned to their p th choice hospital 0 otherwise
For p = l(r i ) + 1 define a variable x i,p whose intuitive meaning is that resident r i is unassigned. Therefore we also have
Constraints in the IP model for hr
The following constraint simply confirms that each variable x i,p must be binary valued for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 ) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r i ) + 1):
As each resident r i ∈ R is either assigned to a single hospital or is unassigned, we introduce the following constraint for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 ):
Since a hospital h j may be assigned to at most c j residents, x i,p = 1 where pref (r i , p) = h j for at most c j residents. We thus obtain the following constraint for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 ):
In a stable matching M in I, if a single resident r i ∈ R has a worse partner than some hospital h j ∈ H where pref (r i , p) = h j and rank(h j , r i ) = q then h j must be fully subscribed with better partners than r i . Therefore, either l(r i )+1 p =p+1
x i,p = 0 or h j is fully subscribed with better partners than r i and
Thus, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 ) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r i )) we obtain the following constraint where pref (r i , p) = h j and rank(h j , r i ) = q:
Objective Function -A maximum cardinalilty matching M in I is a stable matching in which the largest number of residents is matched amongst all of the stable matchings admitted by I. To maximise the size of the stable matching found we apply the following objective function:
Proof of correctness the IP model for HR
Theorem 11. Given an instance I of hr, let J be the corresponding IP model as defined in Section 3.1.1 and Section section:IPModelsHRConstraints. A stable matching in I is exactly equivalent to a feasible solution to J.
Proof. Consider a stable matching M in I. From M we form an assignment of values to the variables x as follows.
Initially set x i,p = 0 for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 ) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r i ) + 1). Then for each (r i , h j ) ∈ M set x i,p = 1, where h j = pref (r i , p). If r i is unassigned then set x i,l(r i )+1 = 1. As each resident has a single partner or is unassigned (but not both), for a given i (1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 ), for exactly one value of p in the range 1 ≤ p ≤ r(i) + 1, x i,p = 1, and for each other value of p in the same range, x i,p = 0, and therefore Constraint 5 holds in the assignment derived from M . Since each hospital is assigned in M to at most c j acceptable residents, Constraint 6 also holds in the assignment derived from M .
Let (r i , h j ) be an acceptable pair not in M . For (r i , h j ) to block, r i must have a partner worse than rank p while simultaneously h j is either under-subscribed or has a partner worse than rank q, where pref (r i , p) = h j and rank(h j , r i ) = q. 
x i,p = c j . Then r i is unassigned or has a worse partner than h j in M . Thus, by the stability of M , h j is full and all of h j 's partners are better than r i . Hence x i,p = 0. Then r i has a better partner than h j in M . Since As all of the constraints in J hold for an assignment derived from a stable matching M , a stable matching M in I represents a feasible solution to J.
Conversely, consider a feasible solution, x, y , to J. From such a solution we form a set of pairs, M , as follows.
. As x satisfies constraints 4, 5 and 6, each resident in M must have exactly one partner or be unassigned (but not both) and each hospital h j in M must have at most c j partners. Therefore the set of pairs M created from the solution x to J, is a matching in I.
We now show that M is stable. Assume (r i , h j ) blocks M . Let pref (r i , p) = h j and rank(h j , r i ) = q. Therefore, r i is unassigned or, has a worse partner than h j and h j is under-subscribed or prefers r i to some member of M (h j ). However, this implies that in {x i ,p : rank(h j , r i ) = q ∧ pref (r i ,p ) = h j )} < c j and therefore Constraint 7 is not satisfied in J, a contradiction. Therefore no such (r i , h j ) can block M .
An IP formulation for hrc
Variables in the IP model for hrc
The IP model extends the model for hr presented in Section 3.1. This extended model is designed around a series of linear inequalities that establish the absence of blocking pairs according to each of the different parts of Definition 1. The variables are defined for each resident, whether single or a member of a couple, and for each element on his/her preference list (with the possibility of being unmatched). A further consistency constraint ensures that each member of a couple obtains hospitals from the same pair in their list, if assigned. Finally, the objective of the IP is to maximise the size of a stable matching, if one exists. The model presented is more complex than existing IP formulations in the literature for stable matching problems [30, 27, 24, 17] simply because of the number of blocking pair cases in Definition 1 required to adequately take account of couples.
Let I be an instance of hrc with residents R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n 1 } and hospitals H = {h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h n 2 }. Without loss of generality, suppose residents r 1 , r 2 . . . r 2c are in couples. Again, without loss of generality, suppose that the couples are (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) (1 ≤ i ≤ c). Suppose that the joint preference list of a couple c i = (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) is:
From this list we create the following projected preference list for resident r 2i−1 :
and the following projected preference list for resident r 2i :
Clearly, the projected preference list of the residents r 2i−1 and r 2i are the same length as the preference list of the couple c i = (r 2i−1 , r 2i ). Let l(c i ) denote the lengths of the preference list of c i and let l(r 2i−1 ) and l(r 2i ) denote the lengths of the projected preference lists of r 2i−1 and r 2i respectively. Then l(r 2i−1 ) = l(r 2i ) = l(c i ). A given hospital h j may appear more than once in the projected preference list of a linked resident in a couple c i = (r 2i−1 , r 2i ).
Let the single residents be r 2c+1 , r 2c+2 . . . r n 1 , where each single resident r i , has a preference list of length l(r i ) consisting of individual hospitals h j ∈ H. Each hospital h j ∈ H has a preference list of individual residents r i ∈ R of length l(h j ). Further, each hospital h j ∈ H has capacity c j ≥ 1, the number of residents with which it may match.
Let pref (r i , p) denote the hospital at position p of a single resident r i 's preference list or on the projected preference list of a resident belonging to a couple where 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 and 1 ≤ p ≤ l(r i ). Let pref ((r 2i , r 2i−1 ), p) denote the hospital pair at position p on the joint preference list of (r 2i−1 , r 2i ).
For an acceptable resident-hospital pair (r i , h j ), let rank(h j , r i ) = q denote the rank which hospital h j assigns resident r i where 1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 , 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 and 1 ≤ q ≤ l(h j ). Thus, rank(h j , r i ) is equal to the number of residents that h j prefers to r i plus one.
Further, for i (
) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(h j )) let the set R(h j , q) contain resident integer pairs (r i , p) such that rank(h j , r i ) = q and pref (r i , p) = h j . Hence:
Intuitively, the set R(h j , q) contains the resident-position pairs (r i , p) such that r i is assigned a rank of q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(h j )) by h j and h j is in position p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r i )) on r i 's preference list.
When considering the exact nature of a blocking pair in the description that follows, the stability definition due to Manlove and McDermid [20] (MM-stability) is applied in all cases. The text in bold before the definition of a constraint shows the section of the MMstability definition with which the constraint corresponds. Hence, a constraint preceded by 'Stability 1' is intended to prevent blocking pairs described by part 1 of the MM-stability definition shown in Definition 1 in Section 1.
Constraints in the IP model for hrc
Similarly, the following constraint confirms that each variable α j,q must be binary valued for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 ) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(h j )):
Also, the following constraint confirms that each variable β j,q must be binary valued for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 ) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(h j )):
Since a hospital h j may match with at most c j residents, x i,p = 1 where pref (r i , p) = h j for at most c j residents. We thus obtain the following constraint for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 ):
For each couple (r 2i−1 , r 2i ), if resident r 2i−1 is assigned to the hospital in position p in their projected preference list then r 2i must also be assigned to the hospital in position p in their projected preference list. We thus obtain the following constraint for all 1 ≤ i ≤ c and 1 ≤ p ≤ l(r 2i−1 ) + 1:
Stability 1 -In a stable matching M in I, if a single resident r i ∈ R has a worse partner than some hospital h j ∈ H where pref (r i , p) = h j and rank(h j , r i ) = q then h j must be fully subscribed with better partners than r i . Therefore, either
Thus, for each i (2c + 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 ) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r i )) we obtain the following constraint where pref (r i , p) = h j and rank(h j , r i ) = q:
Stability 2(a) -In a stable matching M in I, if a couple c i = (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) prefers hospital pair (h j 1 , h j 2 ) (which is at position p 1 on c i 's preference list) to (M (r 2i−1 ), M (r 2i )) (which is at position p 2 ) then it must not be the case that, if h j 2 = M (r 2i ) then h j 1 is under-subscribed or prefers r 2i−1 to one of its partners in M . In the special case in which pref (r 2i−1 , p 1 ) = pref (r 2i , p 1 ) = h j 1 it must not be the case that, if h j 1 = h j 2 = M (r 2i ) then h j 1 is under-subscribed or prefers r 2i−1 to one of its partners in M other than r 2i .
Thus, for the general case, we obtain the following constraint for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and
However, for the special case in which pref (r 2i−1 , p 1 ) = pref (r 2i , p 1 ) = h j 1 we obtain the following constraint for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p 1 , p 2 where (1 ≤ p 1 < p 2 ≤ l(r 2i−1 )) such that pref (r 2i , p 1 ) = pref (r 2i , p 2 ) and rank(h j 1 , r 2i−1 ) = q:
Stability 2(b) -A similar constraint is required for the odd members of each couple. Thus, for the general case, we obtain the following constraint for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p 1 , p 2 where (1 ≤ p 1 < p 2 ≤ l(r 2i )) such that pref (r 2i−1 , p 1 ) = pref (r 2i−1 , p 2 ) and rank(h j 2 , r 2i ) = q:
Again, for the special case in which pref (r 2i−1 , p 1 ) = pref (r 2i , p 1 ) = h j 2 we obtain the following constraint for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p 1 , p 2 where (1 ≤ p 1 < p 2 ≤ l(r 2i )) such that pref (r 2i−1 , p 1 ) = pref (r 2i−1 , p 2 ) and rank(h j 2 , r 2i ) = q:
For all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 ) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(h j )) define a new constraint such that:
Thus, if h j is full with assignees better than rank q then α j,q may take the value 0 or 1. However, if h j is not full with assignees better than rank q then α j,q = 1.
Thus, if h j has c j − 1 or more assignees better than rank q then β j,q may take the value 0 or 1. However, if h j has less than c j − 1 assignees better than rank q then β j,q = 1.
Stability 3(a) -In a stable matching M in I, if a couple c i = (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) is assigned to a worse pair than hospital pair (h j 1 , h j 2 ) (where h j 1 = h j 2 ) it must be the case that for some t ∈ {1, 2}, h jt is full and prefers its worst assignee to r 2i−2+t .
Thus we obtain the following constraint for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r 2i−1 )) where
Stability 3(b) -In a stable matching M in I, if a couple c i = (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) is assigned to a worse pair than (h j , h j ) where M (r 2i−1 ) = h j and M (r 2i ) = h j then h j must not have two or more free posts available.
Stability 3(c) -In a stable matching M in I, if a couple c i = (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) is assigned to a worse pair than (h j , h j ) where M (r 2i−1 ) = h j and M (r 2i ) = h j then h j must not prefer at least one of r 2i−1 or r 2i to some assignee of h j in M while having a single free post.
Both of the preceding stability definitions may be modeled by a single constraint. Thus, we obtain the following constraint for i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r 2i−1 )) such that pref (r 2i−1 , p) = pref (r 2i , p) and h j = pref (r 2i−1 , p) where q = min{rank(h j , r 2i ), rank(h j , r 2i−1 )} :
is jointly assigned to a worse pair than (h j , h j ) where M (r 2i−1 ) = h j and M (r 2i ) = h j then h j must not be fully subscribed and also have two assigned partners r x and r y (where x = y) such that h j strictly prefers r 2i−1 to r x and also prefers r 2i to r y .
For each (h j , h j ) acceptable to (r 2i−1 , r 2i ), let r min be the better of r 2i−1 and r 2i according to hospital h j with rank(h j , r min ) = q min . Analogously, let r max be the worse of r 2i and r 2i−1 according to hospital h j with rank(h j , r max ) = q max . Thus we obtain the following constraint for i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and
Proof of correctness of constraints in the IP model for hrc
Theorem 12. Given an instance I of hr, let J be the corresponding IP model as defined in Section 3.2.1 and Section section:IPModelsHRCConstraints. A stable matching in I is exactly equivalent to a feasible solution to J.
Proof. Consider a stable matching M in I. From M we form an assignment of values to the variables x, α, and β as follows.
Initially set x i,p = 0 for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 ) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r i ) + 1). Then for each (r i , h j ) ∈ M where r i is a single resident, set x i,p = 1, where pref (r i , p) = h j . If r i is unassigned then set x i,l(r i )+1 = 1. If r i is a linked resident, assume without loss of generality that r i = r 2i−1 (respectively r 2i ) then set x 2i−1,p = 1 (respectively x 2i,p = 1) where pref ((r 2i−1 , r 2i ) , p) = (h j 1 , h j 2 ) where h j 1 = M (r 2i−1 ) and h j 2 = M ((r 2i ). If (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) is unassigned then set x 2i−1,l(r 2i−1 )+1 = 1 and x 2i,l(r 2i )+1 = 1.
As each resident has a single partner or is unassigned (but not both), for a given i (1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 ), for exactly one value of p in the range 1 ≤ p ≤ r(i) + 1, x i,p = 1, and for each other value of p in the same range, x i,p = 0, and therefore Constraint 12 holds for x. Also, if x i,p = 1 then for all p = p such that pref (r i , p) = pref (r i , p ), x i,p = 0.
Initially set α j,q = 0 for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 ) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(h j )). Then for each α j,q , if
then set α j,q = 1. Initially set β j,q = 0 for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 ) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(h j )). Then for each β j,q , if
Since, each hospital h j is assigned to at most c j acceptable residents in M , Constraint 13 also holds for x.
For each couple (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) in I, let p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r 2i−1 )) be given. If r 2i−1 is assigned to h j 1 = pref (r 2i−1 , p) in M then r 2i is assigned to h j 2 = pref (r 2i , p) in M . Similarly, for each couple (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) in I, if r 2i−1 is not assigned to h j 1 = pref (r 2i−1 , p) in M then r 2i is not assigned to h j 2 = pref (r 2i , p) in M . Therefore, in the assignment derived from M , x 2i−1,p = x 2i,p for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r 2i−1 ) + 1) (where l(r 2i−1 ) = l(r 2i )) and Constraint 14 is satisfied for x.
Assume x does not satisfy Constraint 15. For all i (2c + 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 ), j (1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 ) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r 2i−1 )), suppose that (r i , h j ) is an acceptable pair not in M where
x i,p = 0 then Constraint 15 is trivially satisfied as
is satisfied. Hence
x i,p = c j , r i must be unassigned or have a partner worse than h j . Also, since
(r i ,p ) ∈ R(h j , q )} < c j , h j is either under-subscribed or has a partner worse than r i . Thus (r i , h j ) blocks M , a contradiction. Hence, Constraint 15 is satisfied by x.
Assume x does not satisfy Constraint 16. For all x 2i,p 2 such that i (1 ≤ i ≤ c), p 1 , p 2 (1 ≤ p 1 < p 2 ≤ l(r 2i−1 )) where h j 1 = pref (r 2i−1 , p 1 ), pref (r 2i , p 1 ) = pref (r 2i , p 2 ) = h j 2 and rank(h j 1 , r 2i−1 ) = q. If c j 1 x 2i,p 2 = 0 then Constraint 16 is trivially satisfied as
(r i ,p ) ∈ R(h j 1 , q )} ≥ c j 1 then Constraint 16 is satisfied. Hence,
However, since c j 1 x 2i,p 2 = c j 1 in x, (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) is jointly assigned to a worse partner than (h j 1 , h j 2 ). Further, since
under-subscribed in M or prefers r 2i−1 to some member of M (h j 1 ). Thus, (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) blocks M with (h j 1 , h j 2 ), a contradiction. Therefore Constraint 16 holds in the assignment derived from M . Assume x does not satisfy Constraint 17. Let there be x 2i,p 2 such that i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and
However, since (c j − 1)x 2i,p 2 = c j − 1 in x, (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) is jointly assigned to a worse partner than (h j , h j ). Further, since
is either under-subscribed in M or prefers r 2i−1 to some assignee in M (h j ) other than r 2i . Thus, (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) blocks M with (h j , h j ), a contradiction. Therefore Constraint 17 holds in the assignment derived from M .
A similar argument for the odd members of the couples in M ensures that Constraints 18 and 19 are also satisfied in x.
Assume x does not satisfy Constraint 22. There exists i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and
x 2i−1,p = 0 then Constraint 22 must be satisfied in x.
Hence,
Since α j 1 ,q 1 = 1,
in M or prefers r 2i−1 to some assignee in M (h j 1 ). Similarly, if α j 2 ,q 2 = 1, then h j 2 is undersubscribed in M or prefers r 2i to some assignee in M (h j 2 ). Also in M , (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) is unassigned or is assigned to a worse partner than (h j 1 , h j 2 ). Thus, (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) blocks M with (h j 1 , h j 2 ), a contradiction. Therefore Constraint 22 is satisfied in x, α, β.
Let
. A simple argument shows that c j − 2 < γ < c j − 1. Thus δ ≤ c j − 2. However, this implies that h j has two free posts in M and (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) is unassigned or is assigned to a worse partner than (h j , h j ). Thus, (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) blocks M with (h j , h j ) , a contradiction. Assume ε = c j − 1. Hence γ = c j − 1. Thus, δ ≤ c j − 2. However, this again implies that h j has two vacant posts in M and (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) is unassigned or is assigned to a worse partner than (h j , h j ). Thus, (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) blocks M with (h j , h j ), a contradiction.
Hence, ε < c j − 1 and thus c j − 1 < γ ≤ c j . Therefore, δ ≤ c j − 1. This implies that h j has a vacant post in M , moreover, h j prefers r 2i−1 or r 2i to at least one of its assignees and (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) is unassigned or is assigned to a worse partner than (h j , h j ). Hence, (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) blocks M with (h j , h j ), a contradiction. Therefore Constraint 23 is satisfied in x.
Assume x, α, β does not satisfy Constraint 24. For some i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r 2i−1 )) where pref (r 2i−1 , p) = pref (r 2i , p) = h j , let r min be the better of r 2i and r 2i−1 according to hospital h j with rank(h j , r min ) = q min .
x 2i−1,p = 1, α j,qmax = 1 and β j,q min = 1. Since α j,qmax = 1,
Thus h j is under-subscribed in M or prefers r 2i−1 to some assignee, r x , in M (h j ). Similarly, if β j,q min = 1 then
Thus h j is under-subscribed in M or prefers r 2i to some assignee, r y , in M (h j ).
This implies that in M , (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) is assigned to a worse partner than (h j , h j ), h j prefers r 2i−1 to some r x ∈ M (h j ) and also prefers r 2i to some r y ∈ M (h j ). Moreover, in M , (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) is unassigned or is assigned to a worse partner than (h j , h j ). Thus, (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) blocks M with (h j , h j ), a contradiction. Therefore Constraint 24 is satisfied in x, α, β. As all of the constraints in J hold for an assignment derived from a stable matching M , a stable matching M in I represents a feasible solution to J.
Conversely, consider a feasible solution, x , to J. From such a solution we form a set of pairs, M , as follows. (r i , p) . As x satisfies Constraints 9, 12 and 13, each resident in M must have exactly one partner or be unassigned (but not both) and each hospital in M must have at most c j assignees.
As x satisfies Constraint 14 each resident couple (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) must be either jointly assigned to a hospital pair (h j 1 , h j 2 ) where pref ((r 2i−1 , r 2i , p) = (h j 1 , h j 2 )) for some p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r 2i−1 )), meaning that (r 2i−1 , h j ) ∈ M and (r 2i , h j 2 ) ∈ M , or jointly unassigned meaning that both r 2i−1 and r 2i are unassigned in M .
Therefore the set of pairs M created from the solution x α β to J, is a matching in I. We now show that M is stable.
Type 1 Blocking Pair -Assume (r i , h j ) blocks M (as a type 1 blocking pair), where r i is a single resident. Let pref (r i , p) = h j and rank(h j , r i ) = q. Therefore, r i is unassigned or, has a worse partner than h j and h j is under-subscribed or prefers r i to some member of M (h j ).
However, this implies that in J, c j l(r i )+1 p =p+1
x i,p = c j and
Type 2 Blocking Pair -Assume (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) blocks M (as a type 2 blocking pair) with
Hence, r 2i has the same hospital in positions p 1 and p 2 , and h j 1 is under-subscribed or prefers r 2i−1 to some member of M (h j 1 ).
Further assume pref (r 2i−1 , p 1 ) = pref (r 2i , p 1 ). Hence c j 1 x 2i,p 2 = c j 1 and
as h j 1 is under-subscribed or prefers r 2i−1 to some member of M (h j 1 ). Hence in J, the RHS of Constraint 16 is at most (c j 1 − 1) and the LHS is equal to c j 1 and therefore Constraint 16 is not satisfied in J, a contradiction. Therefore no such ((r 2i−1 , r 2i ), (h j 1 , h j 2 )) can block M .
Thus, pref (r 2i−1 , p 1 ) = pref (r 2i , p 1 ). Hence (c j 1 − 1)x 2i,p 2 = (c j 1 − 1) and
is under-subscribed or prefers r 2i−1 to some member of M (h j 1 ) other than r 2i . Hence in J, the RHS of Constraint 17 is at most c j 1 − 2 and the LHS is equal to c j 1 − 1 and therefore Constraint 17 is not satisfied in J, a contradiction. Therefore no such ((r 2i−1 , r 2i ), (h j 1 , h j 2 )) can block M . A similar argument can be used to show that the odd member of each couple cannot improve in such a blocking pair in M and therefore Constraint 18 and 19 are both satisfied in the assignment derived from M . Type 3 Blocking Pairs -Suppose that (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) blocks M (as a type 3 blocking pair) with (h j 1 , h j 2 ) where rank((r 2i−1 , r 2i ), (h j 1 , h j 2 )) = p, rank(h j 1 , r 2i−1 ) = q 1 and rank(h j 2 , r 2i ) = q 2 . Hence, (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) is unassigned or prefers (h j 1 , h j 2 ) to (M (r 2i−1 ), M (r 2i )) where h j 1 = M (r 2i−1 ) and h j 2 = M (r 2i ).
Type 3a Blocking Pair -h j 1 = h j 2 . Therefore, h j 1 is under-subscribed or prefers r 2i−1 to some member of M (h j 1 ) and h j 2 is under-subscribed prefers r 2i to some member of M (h j 2 ). However, this implies that both,
x 2i−1,p = 1 and thus Constraint 22 is not satisfied in J, a contradiction. Therefore no such ((r 2i−1 , r 2i ) ,
Type 3b Blocking Pair -h j 1 = h j 2 = h j and h j has two unassigned posts in M . However, this implies that in J,
and also
x 2i−1,p = c j since r 2i−1 and r 2i prefer h j to M (r 2i−1 ) and M (r 2i ) respectively. Hence in J, the RHS of Constraint 23 is at most c j − 2 and the LHS is greater than c j − 1 and therefore Constraint 23 is not satisfied in J, a contradiction. Therefore no such ((r 2i−1 , r 2i ), (h j , h j )) can block M . Type 3c Blocking Pair -h j 1 = h j 2 = h j and h j has a vacant post in M and h j also prefers r 2i−1 or r 2i to some other member of M (h j ). Let q = min{rank(h j , r 2i−1 ), rank(h j , r 2i )}.
However, this implies that in J,
Since h j prefers r 2i−1 or r 2i to some other member of M (h j ) and h j also has a free post
Thus in J, the RHS of Constraint 23 is at most c j − 1 and the LHS is greater than c j − 1 and therefore Constraint 23 is not satisfied in J, a contradiction. Therefore no such ((r 2i−1 , r 2i ), (h j , h j )) can block M .
Type 3d Blocking Pair -h j 1 = h j 2 = h j , h j is fully subscribed and also has two assignees r x and r y (where x = y and neither x nor y is equal to r 2i−1 or r 2i ) such that h j prefers r 2i−1 to r x and also prefers r 2i to r y . Let r min be the better of r 2i and r 2i−1 according to hospital h j with rank(h j , r min ) = q min . Analogously, let r max be the worse of r 2i and r 2i−1 according to hospital h j with rank(h j , r max ) = q max .
However, this implies that both
Hence β j,q min = 1 and α j,qmax = 1. Also
and thus Constraint 24 is not satisfied in J, a contradiction. Therefore no such ((r 2i−1 , r 2i ), (h j 1 , h j 2 )) can block M . Let I be the example instance of hrc shown in Figure 14 where the capacity of each hospital in I is shown after the first colon, followed by the preference list. We shall consider the creation of the corresponding IP model J for the example instance I. For each resident r i ∈ I (1 ≤ i ≤ 6) construct a vector x i consisting of l(r i ) + 1 binary variables, x i,p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r i ) + 1), as shown in Figure 15 , and apply the constraints as described in Section 3.2. Thus, we form an IP model J derived from I.
Creating the IP model for an example hrc instance
x 2,1 x 2,2 x 2,3 x 2,4 x 3 :
x 3,1 x 3,2 x 2,3 x 4 :
x 4,1 x 4,2 x 4,3 x 5 :
x 5,1 x 5,2 x 5,3 x 6 :
x 6,1 x 6,2 x 6,3
Figure 15: Variables created in J from the example instance of hrc shown in Figure 14 .
Let x u denote the assignment of values to the variables in the IP model J shown in Figure 16 . We will show that x u is not a feasible solution to the IP model J and thus, by Theorem 12, does not correspond to a stable matching in I. However, as all instantiations of Constraints 9 -14 hold for x u , x u does correspond to a matching in I, namely M u = {(r 1 , h 2 ), (r 2 , h 3 ), (r 3 , h 1 ), (r 4 , h 3 ), (r 5 , h 1 ), (r 6 , h 2 )}. We shall demonstrate that several constraints in J are violated by x u and that these constraints correspond to blockings pairs of M u in I. Inequality 26 represents the instantiation of Constraint 15 in the case that i = 6 and p = 1. The LHS of Inequality 26 is the product of the capacity of h 1 and the values of the variables that represent r 6 being matched to a worse partner than h 1 or being unmatched. The RHS of Inequality 26 is the summation of the values of the variables that indicate whether h 1 is matched to partners it prefers to r 6 .
The acceptable pair (r 6 , h 1 ) is a Type 1 blocking pair of M u in I. In this case the LHS of Inequality 26 equals 2 and the RHS of Inequality 26 equals 1. Hence Inequality 26 is not satisfied in x u and thus x u is not a feasible solution to J.
Inequality 27 represents the instantiation of Constraint 18 in the case that p1 = 2, p2 = 3 and r = 3. In this case the LHS of Inequality 27 is the product of the capacity of h 1 and the value of the variable that represents r 1 being matched at position 3 on its projected preference list (and thus, since no instance of Constraint 14 is violated, (r 1 , r 2 ) being jointly matched to the pair in position 3 on its joint projected preference list). The RHS of Inequality 27 is the summation of the values of variables which indicate whether h 1 is matched to partners it prefers to r 2 .
The acceptable pair ((r 1 , r 2 ), (h 2 , h 1 )) is a Type 2 blocking pair of M u in I. In this case the LHS of Inequality 27 equals 2 and the RHS of Inequality 27 equals 1. Hence Inequality 27 is not satisfied in x u and thus x u is not a feasible solution to J.
Inequality 28 represents the instantiation of Constraint 22 in the case that i = 1 and p = 1. In this case the summation on the LHS of Inequality 28 is over the variables that represent r 1 being matched to a worse partner than h 1 in position 1 on its projected preference or unmatched. (Since no instance of Constraint 14 is violated in J these variables equally represent (r 1 , r 2 ) being jointly matched to a worse joint partner than (h 1 , h 2 ) or being jointly unmatched). Also, α 1,1 is a variable constrained to take a value of 1 in the case that h 1 prefers less than c 1 residents to r 1 . Similarly, α 2,1 is a variable constrained to take a value of 1 in the case that h 2 prefers less than c 2 residents to r 1 .
The acceptable pair ((r 1 , r 2 ), (h 1 , h 2 )) is a Type 3a blocking pair of M u in I. In this case the summation on the LHS of Inequality 28 equals 1. Also, since r 1 is in first position on h 1 's preference list and thus h 1 prefers no other assignees to r 1 , α 1,1 ≥ (1 − (0/2)) and hence α 1,1 = 1. Similarly, α 2,1 ≥ (1 − (0/2)) since r 2 is in first position on h 2 's preference list and hence α 2,1 = 1. Thus Inequality 28 is not satisfied in x u and x u is not a feasible solution to J. 
In this case the LHS of Inequality 29 equals 2 since r 5 is unmatched and the RHS of Inequality 29 also equals 2 since h 2 has two assignees that it prefers to r 5 . Hence Inequality 29 is satisfied in x s . A similar consideration of other possible blocking pairs of M s in I shows that no constraint is violated by x s and thus x s is a feasible solution of J.
An integer programming formulation for hrct
The Hospitals / Residents Problem with Couples and Ties (hrct) is a generalisation of hrc in which hospitals (respectively residents) may find some subsets of their acceptable residents (respectively hospitals) equally preferable. Residents (respectively hospitals) that are found equally preferable by a hospital (respectively resident) are tied with each other in the preference list of that hospital (respectively resident).
In this section we show how to extend the IP model for hrc as represented in Section 3.2 to the hrct case. In order to do so we require some additional notation.
For an acceptable resident-hospital pair (r i , h j ), where r i is a single resident let rank(r i , h j ) = q denote the rank that resident r i assigns hospital h j where 1 ≤ q ≤ l(r i ). Thus, rank(r i , h j ) is equal to the number of hospitals that r i prefers to h j plus one.
For an acceptable pair ((r s , r t ), (h j , h k )) where c = (r s , r t ) is a couple, let rank(c, (h j , h k )) = q denote the rank that the couple c = (r s , r t ) assigns the hospital pair (h j , h k ) where 1 ≤ q ≤ l(c). Thus, rank(c, (h j , h k )) is equal to the number of hospital pairs that (r s , r t ) jointly prefers to (h j , h k ) plus one.
For each single resident r i ∈ R and integer p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r i )) let
Similarly, in the case of a couple c and integer
Intuitively, for a single resident r i , p + is the largest position on r i 's preference list of a hospital appearing in the same tie on r i 's list as the hospital in position p on r i 's preference list. Also, for a couple (r i , r j ), p + is the largest position on (r i , r j )'s joint preference list of a hospital pair appearing in the same tie on (r i , r j )'s preference list the as hospital pair in position p on (r i , r j )'s joint preference list.
To correctly construct an IP of model HRCT we must make the following alterations to the mechanism described in Section 3.2 for obtaining an IP model from an HRC instance. All constraints are as before unless otherwise noted. Since, a hospital h j may rank some members of M (h j ) equally with r i in HRCT, the summations involving q in Constraints 15 -19 and 23 and the Inequalities 20 and 21 must now range from 1 to q.
Also, since a resident r i may rank M (r i ) equally with h j , the summations involving p in Constraints 15, 22, 23 and 24 must now range from p + + 1 to l(r i ) + 1. Further, we must extend the definition of p 1 and p 2 in Constraints 16 -19 such that 1 ≤ p 1 ≤ p
where r s is the resident involved in each case.
To give an example of a modified constraint, a full description of Stability 1 within the hrct context is:
Stability 1 -In a stable matching M in I, if a single resident r i ∈ R has a partner worse than some hospital h j ∈ H where pref (r i , p) = h j and rank(h j , r i ) = q then h j must be fully subscribed with partners at least as good as r i . Therefore, either
or h j is fully subscribed with partners at least as good as r i , i.e. {x i ,p ∈ X : (r i ,p ) ∈ R(h j , q )} = c j Thus, for each i (2c + 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 ) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r i )) we obtain the following constraint where pref (r i , p) = h j and rank(h j , r i ) = q:
The other constraints in the hrct model follow by adapting the remaining stability criteria in an analogous fashion. Using a proof analogous to that of Theorem 12, the following result may be established.
Theorem 13. Given an instance I of hr, let J be the corresponding IP model as defined in Section 3.4. A stable matching in I is exactly equivalent to a feasible solution to J.
Empirical Results
Introduction
We ran experiments on a Java implementation of the IP models as described in Section 3 applied to both randomly-generated and real data. We present data showing (i) the average time taken to find a maximum cardinality stable matching or report that no stable matching exists, and (ii) the average size of a maximum cardinality stable matching where a stable matching did exist. Instances were generated with a skewed preference list distribution on both sides, taking into account that in practice some residents and hospitals are more popular than others (on both sides, the most popular agent was approximately 3 times as popular as the least popular agent).
All experiments were carried out on a desktop PC with an Intel i5-2400 3.1Ghz processor, with 8Gb of memory running Windows 7. The IP solver used in all cases was CPLEX 12.4 and the model was implemented in Java using CPLEX Concert.
To test our implementation for correctness we used a brute force algorithm which recursively generated all possible matchings admitted by an hrc instance and selected a maximum cardinality stable matching from amongst those matchings or reported that none of the generated matchings was stable. Due to the inefficiency of this algorithm it may only be realistically applied to relatively small instances. When solving several thousand hrc instances involving up to 15 residents our implementation agreed with the brute force algorithm when reporting whether the instance admitted a stable solution and further our implementation returned a stable matching of the same size as a maximum cardinality stable matching output by the brute force algorithm.
For all the instances solved in these experiments, the minimum length of preference list for an individual resident is 5 and the maximum length is 10. In the SFAS application, the joint preference list for a couple (r i , r j ) is derived from the preference lists of the individual residents r i and r j . The joint preference lists of the couples in the SFAS application are constructed as follows. For a couple (r i , r j ), let s (respectively t) be the length of the individual preference list of r i (respectively r j ). Now, let a and b (1 ≤ a ≤ s, 1 ≤ b ≤ t). The rank pair (a, b) represents the a th hospital on resident r i 's individual preference list and the b th hospital on resident r j 's preference list. Couple (r i , r j ) finds acceptable all pairs (h p , h q ) where r i finds h p acceptable and r j finds h q acceptable (st pairs in total). These pairs are ordered as follows. Let L = max{s, t}. Corresponding to every such acceptable pair (h p , h q ), create an L-tuple whose i th entry is the number of residents in the couple who obtain their i th choice (when considering their individual lists) in the pair (h p , h q ). The acceptable pairs on the couple's list are then ordered according to a lexicographically increasing order on the reverse of the corresponding L-tuples. The preference lists of the couples in the randomly generated instances in the experiments that follow are constructed in a similar fashion.
Experiments with randomly generated instances
In the experiments which follow we consider the question of how the time taken to find maximum cardinality stable matchings or report that no stable matching exists in an instance of hrc alters as we vary the parameters of the instance. Further, we consider how the size of a maximum cardinality stable matching supported by an instance changes as we vary the parameters of the instance.
Experiment 1
In this first experiment, we report on data obtained as we increased the number of residents while maintaining a constant ratio of couples, hospitals and posts to residents. For various values of x (100 ≤ x ≤ 1000) in increments of 30, 1000 randomly generated instances were created containing x residents, 0.1x couples and 0.1x hospitals with x available posts which were unevenly distributed amongst the hospitals. The mean time taken to find a maximum cardinality stable matching or report that no stable matching existed in each instance is plotted in Figure 18 for all values of x. Figure 18 also shows charts displaying the percentage of instances encountered which admit a stable solution and the mean size of the maximum cardinality stable solution for all values of x.
The data in Figure 18 shows that the mean time taken to find a maximum cardinality stable matching or report that no stable matching existed increased as we increased the number of residents in the instance. Figure 18 also shows that the percentage of hrc instances admitting a stable matching did not appear to be correlated with the number of residents involved in the instance. Figure 18 also shows that as the number of residents in the instances increased the mean size of the maximum cardinality stable matching supported by the instances increased.
Experiment 2
In our second experiment, we report on results obtained as we increased the the percentage of residents involved in couples while maintaining the same total number of residents, hospitals and posts. For various values of x (0 ≤ x ≤ 250) in increments of 25, 1000 randomly generated instances were created containing 1000 residents, x couples (and hence 1000 − 2x single residents) and 100 hospitals with 1000 available posts which were unevenly distributed amongst the hospitals. The mean time taken to find a maximum cardinality stable matching or report that no stable matching existed in each instance is plotted in Figure 19 for all values of x. In similar fashion to Figure 18 , Figure 19 also shows charts displaying the percentage of instances encountered which admitted a stable matching and the mean size of the maximum cardinality stable solution for all values of x.
The data in Figure 19 shows that the mean time taken to find a maximum cardinality stable matching tends to increased as we increased the number of residents in the instances involved in couples. Further, Figure 19 shows that the percentage of hrc instances that admitted a stable matching fell as the percentage of the residents in the instances involved in couples increased. When 50% of the residents in the instance were involved in a couple we found that 832 of the 1000 instances admitted a stable matching. Figure 19 also shows that as the percentage of the residents in the instances involved in couples increased the mean size of a maximum cardinality stable matching supported by the instances tended to decrease.
We conjecture that, as the number of couples increases while the number of residents remains the same, the cardinality of the set of stable matchings supported decreases. This is suggested by the fact that the number of instances where the set of stable matchings is of cardinality zero increases. Hence this in turn suggests that the range of sizes of the stable matchings, across the set of all stable matchings admitted, contracts, and thus the size of the largest matching in that set decreases
Experiment 3
In our third experiment, we report on data obtained as we increased the number of hospitals in the instance while maintaining the same total number of residents, couples and posts. For various values of x (25 ≤ x ≤ 500) in increments of 25, 1000 randomly generated instances of size 1000 were created consisting of 1000 residents in total, x hospitals, 100 couples (and hence 800 single residents) and 1000 available posts which were unevenly distributed amongst the hospitals. The time taken to find a maximum cardinality stable matching or report that no stable matching existed in each instance is plotted in Figure 20 for all values of x. Again, in similar fashion to Figure 18 , Figure 20 also shows charts displaying the percentage of instances encountered which admitted a stable matching and the mean size of a maximum cardinality stable solution for all values of x. Figure 20 shows that the mean time taken to find a maximum cardinality stable matching tended to decrease as we increased the number of hospitals in the instances. We believe that this is due to the hospitals' preference lists becoming shorter, thereby reducing the model's complexity. The data in Figure 20 also shows that the percentage of hrc instances admitting a stable matching appeared to increase with the number of hospitals involved in the instance. We conjecture that this is because, as each hospital has a smaller number of posts, it is more likely to become full, and therefore less likely to be involved in a blocking pair due to being under-subscribed. Finally, the data shows that as the number of hospitals in the instances increased, the mean size of a maximum cardinality stable matching supported by the instances tended to decrease. This can be explained by the fact that, as the number of hospitals increases but the residents' preference list lengths and the total number of posts remain constant, the number of posts per hospital decreases. Hence the total number of posts among all hospitals on a resident's preference list decreases.
Experiment 4
In our last experiment, we report on data obtained as we increased the length of the individual preference lists for the residents in the instance while maintaining the same total number of residents, couples, hospitals and posts. For various values of x (3 ≤ x ≤ 12) in increments of 1, 1000 randomly generated instances of size 1000 were created consisting of 1000 residents in total, 100 hospitals, 100 couples (and hence 800 single residents) and 1000 available posts which were unevenly distributed amongst the hospitals. The time taken to find a maximum cardinality stable matching or report that no stable matching existed in each instance is plotted in Figure 21 for all values of x. Again, in similar fashion to Figure 18 , Figure 21 also shows charts displaying the percentage of instances encountered admitting a stable matching and the mean size of a maximum cardinality stable solution for all values of x. Figure 21 shows that the mean time taken to find a maximum cardinality stable matching increased as we increased the length of the individual residents' preference lists in the instances. The data in Figure 21 also shows that the percentage of hrc instances admitting a stable matching did not appear to be correlated with the length of the individual residents' preference lists in the instances and further that as the length of the individual residents' preference lists in the instances increased, the mean size of a maximum cardinality stable matching supported by the instances also tended to increase. The first and third of these phenomena would seem to be explained by the fact that the underlying graph is simply becoming more dense. 
Performance of the model with real world data
In the context of the SFAS matching scheme, hospitals' preferences were derived from the residents' scores, where a junior doctor's score is derived from their previous academic performance. If two residents received the same score, they would be tied in a hospital's preference list. Thus, the underlying SFAS matching problem may be correctly modelled by hrct. Hence, we further extended our implementation in the fashion described in Section 3.4 to find maximum cardinality stable matchings in instances of hrct and were able to find optimal solutions admitted by the real data obtained from the SFAS application. The worst case time and space complexity and the number of constraints in the hrc model is the same as the hr model. The maximum cardinality stable matchings obtained in the SFAS application for the three years to 2012 are shown in Table 1 alongside the time taken to find these matchings. 
Number of Residents
MM-stability and BIS-stability
In Section 5.1 we demonstrate that BIS-stability and MM-stability are not equivalent by means of a pair of example instances, the first of which admits an MM-stable matching, but no BIS-stable matching and the second of which admits a BIS-stable matching, but no MM-stable matching. Then, in Section 5.2 we present a cloning methodology for hrc that can be used to construct an instance of one-to-one hrc from an instance of many-to-one hrc such that the MM-stable matchings in the many-to-one instance are in correspondence to the MM-stable matchings in the one-to-one instance. We prove further that this cloning method is not applicable under BIS-stability.
Distinction between MM-stability and BIS-stability
MM-stability and the BIS-stability are not equivalent. We demonstrate this by means of the two instances shown in Figure 22 and Figure 23 . Consider the instance of HRC shown in Figure 22 where h has capacity 2. The matching M = {(r 3 , h)} is BIS-stable, but the instance admits no MM-stable matching. Figure 23: An instance of HRC which admits an MM-stable matching that but admits no BIS-stable matching.
Consider the instance of hrc shown in Figure 23 due to Irving [15] , where h 1 has capacity 2 and h 2 has capacity 1. The instance admits three distinct matchings, namely M 1 = {(r 1 , h 1 ), (r 2 , h 1 )}, M 2 = {(r 3 , h 1 ), (r 4 , h 1 )} and M 3 = {(r 3 , h 1 ), (r 4 , h 2 )}. M 2 is MM-stable. However, M 1 is BIS-blocked by (r 3 , r 4 ) with (h 1 , h 2 ), M 2 is BIS-blocked by (r 1 , r 2 ) with (h 1 , h 1 ), and M 3 is BIS-blocked by (r 3 , r 4 ) with (h 1 , h 1 ).
A hospital cloning method for hrc under MM-stability
For an arbitrary instance I of hr in which the hospitals may have capacity greater than one, Gusfield and Irving [13] describe a method of constructing a corresponding instance, I of hr in which all of the hospitals have capacity one, such that a stable matching in I corresponds to a stable matching in I and vice versa. In this section we describe a method for producing an instance I of hrc, in which all of the hospitals have capacity one, from an arbitrary instance I of hrc, in which the hospitals may have capacity greater than one, such that an MM-stable matching in I corresponds to an MM-stable matching in I and vice versa. We show that this correspondence breaks down in the case of BIS-stability.
Let I be an instance of hrc with residents R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n 1 } and hospitals H = {h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h n 2 }. Without loss of generality, suppose residents r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r 2c are in couples.
Again, without loss of generality, suppose that the couples are (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) (1 ≤ i ≤ c). Let the single residents be r 2c+1 , r 2c+2 . . . r n 1 .
Suppose each single resident r i ∈ R has a preference list of length l(r i ) consisting of individual hospitals h j ∈ H. Suppose also that the joint preference list of a couple c i = (r 2i−1 , r 2i ) is a list, of length l(c i ), of hospital pairs. Assume each hospital h j ∈ H (1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 ) has a preference list of individual residents r i ∈ R of length l(h j ). Let c j denote the capacity of hospital h j ∈ H (1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 ), the number of available posts it has to match with residents.
To construct an equivalent instance I of one-to-one hrc from I we create c j clones of each hospital h j ∈ H, namely h j,1 , h j,2 . . . h j,c j , each of unitary capacity and each representing one of the individual posts in h j . In the preference list of a single resident r i we replace each incidence of h j with the following sequence of hospitals h j,1 , h j,2 . . . h j,c j .
For each couple c i , we replace each (h j 1 , h j 2 ) (where j 1 = j 2 ) in (r 2i−1 , r 2i )'s joint preference list with the following sequence of hospital pairs: ,1 , h j2,1 ), (h j1,2 , h j2,1 ) . . . (h j1,cj 1 , h j2,1 ), (h j1,1 , h j2,2 ), (h j1,2 , h j2,2 ) . . . It remains open to investigate the performance of the model as we increase the size of the instance substantially beyond that of the SFAS application. It would also be of further interest to investigate other modelling frameworks, for example involving pseudoboolean solvers or CP strategies.
The IP model for hrc presented here might also be updated to produce maximum cardinality stable matchings under other stability definitions, most obviously BIS-stability. It would be of interest to compare an IP model producing exact maximum cardinality BISstable matchings against hrc heuristics such as those compared and contrasted by Biró et al [6] .
